Introduction
Improvements were necessary: the original Project BioShield 1 proved to be insufficient to meet the needs of the government for acquiring medical countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile. BioShield could not be used to fund advanced development of medical countermeasures because of strict provisions in the legislation, so technologies and products that might be of interest to the government could not be shepherded through development to maturity, when they could be stockpiled. Biopharmaceutical companies were also less likely or able to fund the advanced development of potential countermeasures themselves, unwilling to take the considerable financial risk that their products would fail in development or not be procured by BioShield even if the products were successful. Some companies, mostly smaller biotechnology companies, pursued products with hopes of a BioShield procurement contract in spite of the risks. In general, however, large biopharmaceutical companies were uninterested in entering an uncertain, risky market where the US government would be their sole customer.
The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 2 sought to correct the shortcomings in Project BioShield by allowing for funding of advanced development of products under a new contracting mechanism called the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). The legislation also modified Project BioShield so that milestone payments could be made to companies, without the need for companies to repay the funding to the government if the product fails or the contract is canceled.
Project BioShield
After the anthrax attacks in 2001, there was broad concern that the US lacked vaccines and therapeutics against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. BioShield set strict limits for how the government may procure medical countermeasures. Before a contract is awarded, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must make a 'material threat determination,' to determine that there is a significant threat to the US that warrants a countermeasure. HHS must then evaluate the medical and public health consequences of the specific threat, and determine what medical countermeasures would be required to mitigate the threat. Only after interagency consultations and presidential approval may HHS award a BioShield contract. To be eligible for an award, the government must determine that the countermeasure will be available in 'sufficient quantities' and will be able to be licensed by the FDA within eight years. 4 If the countermeasure is not licensed at the time of delivery to the stockpile, the government may opt to purchase the countermeasure at a discounted price, with a bonus payable to the manufacturer upon FDA licensure. The government may also opt to make advance payments to the manufacturer before delivery, but if the contract is canceled, those advance payments must be repaid. Project BioShield was intended to encourage industry to develop medical countermeasures for CBRN threats, primarily by creating a market for such products. Having a 10-year fund specifically for procurement of countermeasures was thought to be an incentive for industry, as it reduces the usual year-by-year change in governmental appropriations and political priorities. 6 However, even with this security, it was generally felt that Project BioShield did not go far enough to encourage industry participation in medical countermeasure development, as shown by the small handful of countermeasures it has procured for the stockpile. There are three important reasons for this:
BioShield does not support advanced development of medical countermeasures As BioShield is a late-stage procurement program for medical countermeasures to be deposited in the stockpile, the developer bore much of the financial and developmental risk. Early development could be funded through NIH or Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants. 8 BioShield could procure licensed countermeasures or countermeasures that will likely be licensed within eight years; however, advanced development steps between these two funding mechanisms were not covered by government funding. This gap in funding has been referred to as the 'Valley of Death,' and it has been a significant disincentive for industry participation in the development of medical countermeasures against CBRN threats, particularly for small biotechnology companies, which could ill afford to pay for the gap in funding. 5 In addition to being a burden on companies, the Valley of Death was disadvantageous to the US government. As BioShield funding could not contribute to the preclinical stage of medical countermeasure development, the government was forced to rely on market forces to encourage the development of new products or technologies that might eventually be procured under BioShield. 6 BioShield did not attract significant attention from large pharmaceutical companies When Project BioShield was signed into law, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) stated that they hoped for 'procurement provisions that more closely resemble the competitive private market in which the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries ordinarily operate,' which BioShield did not. 9 The funding of $5.6 billion over 10 years was not seen as sufficient to entice involvement of the larger pharmaceutical companies, and selling a product for procurement to the US stockpile was just not seen as attractive to industry as a product that has recurring annual sales and a broader commercial market. 6 The pharmaceutical companies' experience in developing and manufacturing medicines and vaccines, and bringing them to market, was thus not available for biodefense countermeasures.
BioShield contract uncertainties put developers at risk BARDA will be exempt from certain Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) disclosure requirements for information that 'reveals significant and not otherwise publicly known vulnerabilities of existing medical or public health defenses.' This exemption will be subject to review every five years, and sunsets (terminates) after seven years.
Establishes the
Biodefense Medical Countermeasure Development Fund There was $1.07 billion authorized for advanced development funding, separate from the BioShield Special Reserve Fund. The authorization included funds already committed to advanced development programs, such as pandemic influenza preparedness and medical countermeasure development at NIH/National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID). However, as of this writing, no funds have been appropriated for the BARDA development fund in FY2008. The President's FY2008 budget requests $189 million for the BARDA fund, but it is not yet clear what will be appropriated by Congress.
Establishes the National Biodefense Science Board
Under the Act, the Board will 'provide expert advice and guidance to the Secretary on scientific, technical, and other mattersy regarding current and future chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological agents, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate. The board will consist of US government officials, 4 representatives of the biopharma and medical device industry, 4 academic representatives, and 5 others including at least one practicing healthcare professional and one representative of healthcare consumers.' The Act directs HHS to convene the first meeting of the Board in December 2007 (this meeting took place on the 17-18 December 2007; a report can be found here: http:// www.hhs.gov/aspr/omsph/nbsb/). Working groups may also be convened under the Board, to give advice to BARDA about medical countermeasures. This may include identifying innovative research for development by BARDA, or identifying animal models or other research tools that could accelerate countermeasure development.
Directs the FDA to provide technical assistance to the developers of medical countermeasures on manufacturing and regulatory processes These FDA experts will provide countermeasure manufacturers with off-site and on-site assistance.
Gives HHS new authorities to expedite countermeasure development, including expanded authorities for BioShield
The Act gives the Secretary of the HHS several new authorities to promote the development and procurement of medical countermeasures. These authorities include the ability to award procurement contracts, grants, and co-operative agreements; to select 'other transactions' authority (in addition to the usual authorities allowed under the Federal Acquisitions Regulation 13 ) as well as to expedite procurement authorities; to expedite to peer review; to offer personal service contracts; to waive advance payment and advertising requirements that govern US government contracts; to make awards to foreign nationals; and to establish research centers.
Most importantly, the Act specifies new BioShield contract authorities to make milestone payments (ranging from 5 to 50% of the total contract amount), which do not have to be repaid if the vendor fails to deliver finished product to the stockpile. In addition, HHS may enter into exclusive sales contracts, and may establish a 'warm-base manufacturing' capacity for a countermeasure, which means that there would be a limited amount of annual production of the countermeasure, which could be ramped up in a public health emergency. The Secretary of HHS was also granted some limited antitrust exemption authorities to facilitate communication to improve the development of medical countermeasures.
Challenges for implementation of the new authorities
Managing 'fixed' and 'flexible' countermeasures As the average drug or vaccine may take eight to 10 years to develop, and cost upward of $800 million, developing and stockpiling medical countermeasures against each CBRN threat will require a great deal of time and money, and may not be possible. 14, 15 For example, there are 28 biological agents in the 2006 DHS risk assessment that are thought to have potential use in terrorism. 16 If factors such as antibiotic resistance are considered in addition to these threats, the number of potential threats expands further. Natural biological agents will also certainly cause epidemics for which no countermeasure existsFas SARS did in 2003Fand the current methods for producing medical countermeasures are insufficient to meet that need. In response to these concerns, there have been calls for an alternative medical countermeasure strategy to 'one bug, one drug' or 'fixed' defenses.
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The alternative is a 'flexible defense' for medical countermeasure development, which is now part of HHS's mission: BARDA is intended to promote 'innovation to reduce the time and cost of countermeasure y development' as well as improve the development of research tools, rapid diagnostics, broad-spectrum antimicrobials, and vaccine technologies. The White House has also issued a directive (HSPD-18) for a 'broad-spectrum 'flexible' approach to address other current and future [CBRN] threats' in addition to defenses against a finite number of 'known or anticipated agents.' 20 This gives HHS a mandate to define operationally what a flexible defense will entail for medical countermeasures against CBRN threats.
HHS is not planning to abandon fixed defenses, which they 'determined to be effective and viable for some of the
www.eht-journal.orghighest priority threats such as smallpox and anthrax.' 21 But beyond the specific countermeasures that are of the highest priority, HHS will be focusing efforts to develop and/ or acquire 'broad-spectrum solutions using technologies that enable more flexible next generation interventional concepts.' 22 Flexible defense has not yet been defined operationally, and the timelines for funding, developing, producing, and prioritizing a flexible defense strategy remain unclear. 23 Much research will be required to realize the goal of an effective antiviral arsenal, for example, and many relevant technologies are in their infancy. HHS statements recognize this and suggest that most flexible defense research will be pursued by NIH, whose 'long-term focus is on platform technologies and broad-spectrum medical countermeasures that will allow for the rapid introduction of additional response capabilities for emerging infectious agents.' 24 In addition to long timelines, HHS should consider how it will prioritize investment in these technologies. For example, it may be difficult to decide how funding for antiviral mechanisms may be more or less important than funding for new broad-spectrum antibiotics. BioSolutions was awarded contracts including up to $11.5 million in milestone payments to advance a postexposure prophylaxis indication for BioThrax, the anthrax vaccine, 28 as well as a $9.5 million for nonclinical and clinical studies of anthrax immune globulin. 29 HHS has also made recent efforts to communicate more with the biopharmaceutical industry. They recently published a strategy document and implementation plan for medical countermeasure development, 22, 24, 30 they launched a stakeholders web portal, held a stakeholders workshop to get feedback on their plans in the summer of 2007, and held a 'BARDA Industry Day' for companies and stakeholders to demonstrate their technologies to HHS personnel. 31 Adequate funding and tolerance of risk for developing countermeasures Developing drugs or vaccines is not only expensive, but risky: more than 80% of pharmaceutical drugs in Phase I development will eventually fail. 32 Given these realities, it is likely that most CBRN countermeasures HHS will pursue will fail, and they will cost a great deal of money. Because this failure rate is well understood by industry, they require incentives to participate in making medical countermeasures for the US stockpile, such as rewards for milestones compared with only rewarding finished products. However, it is unclear whether the funders of the countermeasure effortFthe US CongressFwill understand that only a small portion of investments may succeed, and that each investment may be substantial. A concerted effort may be needed to make the Congressional and other governmental leaders understand the necessary risks associated with countermeasure development, as well as the necessary scale of investment in the nation's medical countermeasure enterprise.
Conclusion
The US government has taken steps to develop a system to procure medical countermeasures for CBRN threats, to protect its citizens in the event of a public health emergency. Without a commercial market to encourage the development of the vaccines, drugs, diagnostics, and technologies that are needed, the government has had to create a market, and encourage commercial developers of medical countermeasures to participate. Largely, it has done this through Project BioShield, and now through the BARDA, created through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act. It is too early to tell whether BARDA will be successful in its aims. However, the chance of its success will depend a great deal on whether these authorities are funded commensurate with their purpose, and in line with the commercial market.
